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KTUNAXA NATION V. BRITISH COLUMBIA: 
A HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF 
CANADIAN ABORIGINAL LAW 
Jennifer Mendoza† 
Abstract:  Aboriginal law is a developing and emerging area of the law in Canada. 
In fact, Aboriginal rights were not constitutionally protected until the ratification of the 
Canadian Constitution in 1982. What followed was a series of precedent-setting cases that 
clarified what “rights” meant under Section 35 of the Constitution, how Aboriginal title and 
rights could be established, and what duty the federal government had to the First Nations 
when trying to infringe on those rights. In 2017, the Canadian Supreme Court heard Ktunaxa 
Nation v. British Columbia, which was the first case to interpret Aboriginal rights under 
Section 2(a) religious freedoms claims of the Canadian Charter of Freedom and Rights. There, 
the Canadian Supreme Court decided that the Ktunaxa Nation did not have religious freedom 
claim under Section 2(a) over their traditional territory. The decision allowed Glacier Resorts 
Ltd. and the province of British Columbia to begin building a year-long ski resort that would 
destroy sacred Ktunaxa land and drive away the grizzly bear population—which played a 
significant role in the Ktunaxa’s religious beliefs. Given that the Ktunaxa brought a religious 
freedom claim under Section 2(a) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, their 
argument was not able to withstand scrutiny in Court. This demonstrated that Aboriginal 
peoples are instead more likely to succeed with claims under Section 35 of the Constitution. 
As such, instead of looking at Ktunaxa Nation v. British Columbia as another precedent-setting 
case, this case is arguably of little precedential value given the limited record that was available 
when the Supreme Court of Canadian heard the case. 
Cite as: Jennifer Mendoza, Ktunaxa Nation v. British Columbia: A Historical and Critical 
Analysis of Canadian Aboriginal Law, 29 WASH. INT’L L.J. 685 (2020). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On November 2, 2017, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled in Ktunaxa 
Nation v. British Columbia that the Ktunaxa Nation did not have a religious 
freedom claim to protect their traditional land.1 The Ktunaxa had been fighting  
the construction of a permanent ski resort on Qat’muk, their traditional land, 
 
†  The author would like to thank Professor Eric Eberhard for his advice and support throughout the 
comment-writing process. 
1  Ktunaxa Nation v. British Columbia, 2017 SCC 54 (Can.). 
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for over 20 years. Qat’muk is inhabited by grizzly bears,2 which are a symbol 
of great importance to the Ktunaxa’s religion as they represent the Grizzly 
Bear Spirit—who is a symbol of strength, guidance, and protection for their 
community.3 However, the Court held that the Crown had not infringed on the 
Ktunaxa’s religious belief or practice and the Crown had also met its 
consultation obligation with the Ktunaxa.4  
The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision is of limited precedential 
value because the Ktunaxa Nation did not make a claim under Section 35 of 
the Canadian Constitution. A claim under Section 35, which governs 
Aboriginal law, would have been more likely to succeed and to stop the 
construction of the ski resort on Qat’muk.  
Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, provides constitutional 
protection to the Aboriginal and treaty rights of Aboriginal peoples in 
Canada.5 It provides indigenous peoples in Canada with rights that may 
include access to ancestral lands and resources, and the right to self-
government.6 This section falls outside of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms (“the Charter”), which guarantees certain political rights to 
Canadian citizens and civil rights to everyone in Canada. For example, in 
contrast to Section 35, Section 2(a) of the Charter governs freedom of 
religion.7   
Section 35 of the Canadian Constitution prohibits extinguishing 
existing Aboriginal land rights without the consent of those First Nations 
holding interest in those lands.8 Government regulation of Aboriginal land 
rights is only possible after appropriate and meaningful consultation with the 
affected Aboriginal communities. This means that if the government wishes 
 
2  Id. paras. 11–14. 
3  Ktunaxa Nation, Qat’muk, http://www.ktunaxa.org/qatmuk/ (last visited May 3, 2020) [hereinafter 
Qat’muk].  
4  See Carolyn Harris, Crown, THE CANADIAN ENCYCLOPEDIA, 
https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/crown (last updated Apr. 1, 2016) (Canada is a 
constitutional monarchy. The current sovereign of Canada is Queen Elizabeth II). 
5  Constitution Act, 1982, Section 35, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.). 
6  William B. Henderson & Catherine Bell, Rights of Indigenous Peoples in Canada, THE CANADIAN 
ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/aboriginal-rights (last updated Dec. 11, 
2019). 
7  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, Section 2(a), being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.). 
8  “First Nations” and “Aboriginals” will be used interchangeably throughout this case note to refer to 
the Indigenous people of Canada. 
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to take land from a First Nation, they must consult with said nation. If the 
Indigenous peoples do not consent, the government may still be able to take 
the land by showing that it made a reasonable effort to consult with them and 
reach an agreement. The Canadian Supreme Court found that the Canadian 
government demonstrated meaningful consultation and an effort to reach an 
agreement, which allowed the ski resort on Qat’muk to be built despite 
objection by the Ktunaxa Nation. 
The Canadian Supreme Court has long held that the Canadian 
government has a fiduciary relationship to Aboriginals under Section 35 of 
the Constitution Act, 1982.9 In 1990, under R. v. Sparrow, the Supreme Court 
of Canada held that any denial of Aboriginal rights under Section 35 must be 
justified and that Aboriginal rights must be given priority, providing that these 
rights existed at the time of the Constitution Act, 1982; thereby, creating the 
“Sparrow Test.”10 In R. v. Van der Peet, the Court went beyond the Sparrow 
Test and developed the “Integral to a Distinctive Culture Test,” which is used 
to determine how to define an aboriginal right.11 Later, in Delgamuukw v. 
British Columbia, the Court created the “Test of Justification” to determine 
whether the government can infringe on Aboriginal title.12 In 2004, the Court 
in Haida Nation v. British held that the Crown has a duty to consult with and 
accommodate Aboriginal groups with claims to land and Aboriginal rights 
prior to taking action that may adversely affect those interests.13 The scope of 
this duty will vary with the strength of the claim.14 The strength of the claim 
for a right or title and the seriousness of the potential effect upon the claimed 
right or title, will proportionately escalate the duty involved.15 However, 
regardless of what the scope of the duty is determined to be, consultation must 
always be meaningful.16  
 
9  See generally Isabelle Brideau, The Duty to Consult Indigenous People 2 (Library of Parliament, 
Background Paper Publication No. 2019-17-E, 2019), 
https://lop.parl.ca/staticfiles/PublicWebsite/Home/ResearchPublications/BackgroundPapers/PDF/2019-17-
e.pdf. 
10  R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075, paras. 1076–80 (Can.); Erin Hanson & Tanisha Salomons, 
Sparrow Case, FIRST NATIONS & INDIGENOUS STUD.: U. OF B.C., 
https://indigenousfoundations.arts.ubc.ca/sparrow_case/ (last visited May 7, 2020). 
11  R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507, para. 44–45 (Can.); Erin Hanson & Tanisha Salomons, 
supra note 10. 
12  Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, para. 160–62 (Can.) 
13  Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2004 SCC 73, [2004] 3 SCR 511 (Can.) 
14  Id. paras. 36–38.  
15  Id. paras. 39, 68–71. 
16  Id. paras.  41–42. 
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II. THE BACKDROP: AN OVERVIEW OF KTUNAXA V. BRITISH COLUMBIA AND 
THE HISTORY OF CANADIAN ABORIGINAL LAW 
A. The Parties 
 The parties at issue were the Appellants, the Ktunaxa Nation, the 
Respondents, Glacier Resort Ltd., which wanted to build the ski resort, and 
the Canadian government, which controlled the land and wanted to allow 
Glacier Resort to build a ski resort.  
1. The Appellants 
The appellants in this case were the Ktunaxa people. The Ktunaxa’s 
traditional territories are located on the international boundary between the 
United States and Canada.17 It includes northeastern Washington, northern 
Idaho, nonwestern Montana, southwestern Alberta and southeastern British 
Columbia.18 For thousands of years, the Ktunaxa enjoyed the natural bounty 
of the land they lived on, seasonally migrating all over their traditional 
territory to follow the vegetation and hunting cycles.19 They obtained all of 
their food, medicine, and materials needed for shelter and clothing from this 
area—across the Rocky Mountains and on the Great Plains of both Canada 
and the United States.20 Located at the northwestern part of their larger 
territory is an area the Ktunaxa call Qat’muk—a place of spiritual significance 
for the Ktunaxa “where the Grizzly Bear Spirit was born, goes to heal itself, 
and returns to the spirit world.”21 As a result, the land of Qat’muk and the 
Grizzly Bear Spirit are “inextricably interlinked,” with Qat’muk being the 
“unique and proper place to celebrate and [honor] this spirit”—akin to a place 
of worship.22 
2. The Respondents 
The respondents were Glacier Resort Ltd. (“Glacier Resorts”). The 
resort company wished to build a year-long ski resort on Jumbo Valley in 
 
17  Ktunaxa Nation v. British Columbia, 2017 SCC 54, para. 1 (Can.). 
18  Id. para. 2; Ktunaxa Nation, Who We Are, http://www.ktunaxa.org/who-we-are/ (last visited Apr. 6, 
2019) [hereinafter Who We Are]. 
19  Id. 
20  Id. 
21  Ktunaxa Nation v. British Columbia, 2017 SCC 54, para. 3 (Can.); Qat’muk, supra note 3. 
22  Qat’muk, supra note 3; Ktunaxa Nation, Qat’muk Declaration, http://www.ktunaxa.org/who-we-
are/qatmuk-declaration/ (last visited May 6, 2020). 
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Qat’muk with lifts to glacier tuns and overnight accommodations for guests 
and staff.23 
B. Timeline of the Glacier Resort Permanent Ski Resort Project 
The contentious battle between the Ktunaxa people and Glacier Resorts 
goes back to the 1980s when Glacier Resorts became interested in building a 
permanent ski resort in the Jumbo Valley, a traditional territory of the 
Ktunaxa.24 However, it was not until 1991 that Glacier Resorts filed a formal 
proposal to build this resort.25 This triggered the beginning of the consultation 
process with the Aboriginal peoples inhabiting the land—the Crown has a 
duty to consult with Aboriginals prior to taking any action that may adversely 
affect their interests.26  
Early on, the Ktunaxa and the Shuswap people expressed concern over 
the impact that this resort project would have on the land.27 While it is not 
clear if it was a specific band or tribe involved in the initial consultation, the 
Shuswap Nation is made up of nine Secwepemc communities in the Southern 
Interior of British Columbia; thus, they also inhabited part of the land where 
the resort would be built.28 
Until 2005, the Ktunaxa and the Shuswap participated jointly in the 
regulatory processes. However, that same year, the Shuswap changed their 
position and indicated their support of the ski resort project; they believed that 
their interests had been reasonably accommodated and that the project would 
be good for their community.29 The Ktunaxa, on the other hand, still opposed 
the project and consultation with them continued.30 In total, the consultation 
with the Ktunaxa and the regulatory process for approval of the ski resort took 
place between 1991 until 2011—over 20 years.31 In 2011, despite vehement 
 
23  Ktunaxa Nation v. British Columbia, 2017 SCC 54, para. 4 (Can.). 
24  Id. para. 12. 
25  Id. para. 16. 
26  Haida Nation v. British Columbia, 2004 SCC 73, paras. 35, 47 (Can.). 
27  Id. para. 5.  
28  About, SHUSWAP NATION TRIBAL COUNCIL, https://shuswapnation.org/about/bands/ (last visited 
Apr. 6, 2019). 
29  Ktunaxa Nation v. British Columbia, 2017 SCC 54, paras. 6, 14 (Can.). 
30  Id. para. 14. 
31  Id. paras. 13, 16–43. The regulatory process consist of four stages: “(1) The Commercial Alpine Ski 
Policy (‘CASP’) process to determine sole proponent status; (2) The Commission on Resources and the 
Environment (‘CORE’) process to determine best uses of the land; (3) An environmental assessment process 
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opposition by the Ktunaxa Nation, the Minister approved the ski resort 
project.32  
The Ktunaxa sought judicial review of the Minister’s decision.33 The 
Ktunaxa appealed this decision on the basis that the project would violate their 
constitutional right to freedom of religion because the grizzly bears who 
inhabit the area are an important part of their spiritual beliefs.34 Additionally, 
they argued that the Minister’s decision breached the Crown’s duty of 
consultation and accommodation.35  
In the beginning of the opinion, the Supreme Court of Canada agreed 
that the Ktunaxa do have a sincere spiritual connection to the area inhabited 
by grizzly bears, whose spirit is an important part of their beliefs.36 However 
the Supreme Court of Canada ultimately ruled against the Ktunaxa, holding 
that the project did not in fact violate their freedom of religion, nor was the 
consultation inadequate.37 The Court reasoned that the Ktunaxa were not 
seeking protection for the freedom to believe in the Grizzly Bear Spirit or 
freedom to manifest that belief, but rather sought to protect the grizzly bears’ 
presence in Qat’muk.38 The Court stated that this was an overreach of Section 
2(a) of the Charter, which protected the religious freedom of indigenous 
people in Canada.39 The crux of this decision also rested on the fact that this 
religious freedom claim was contingent on the assertion that the consultation 
over the project was inadequate.40 The Court relied almost exclusively on this 
detail to determine whether this freedom of religion claim was valid. Upon 
finding that the consultation was reasonable and adequate, though it took two 
decades to eventuate an unsatisfactory proposal with the Ktunaxa, the Court 
concluded that everything possible had been done to respect their religious 
 
to resolve issues related to environmental, wildlife and cultural impact and culminating in an Environmental 
Assessment Certificate (‘EAC’); and (4) submission of a Master Plan which, if approved, would lead to a 
Master Development Agreement (“MDA”) between the developer and the government.” The process 
included the consultation with the Ktunaxa, who participated in every stage. 
32  Id. 
33  Id. para. 7. 
34  Id. para. 1. 
35  Id. para. 7. 
36  Id. para. 69. 
37  Id. para. 115. 
38  Id. paras. 70–71. 
39  Id. 
40  Id. paras. 89, 104. 
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rights and concerns.41 As a result, there was no basis for the religious claim 
nor was consultation inadequate. 
These arguments are not persuasive. While it is true that the 
consultation between the Crown—in this case the government of British 
Columbia and Glacier Resorts—and the Ktunaxa Nation lasted a long time 
and considered the Ktunaxa’s spiritual connection to grizzly bears and the 
land, the decision ultimately infringes on the nation’s religious rights. There 
is an undeniable connection between the title to the land and the religious 
claim of the Ktunaxa. The reason the land is so important to the Ktunaxa is 
because it plays a central role in their religious beliefs.42 Without the land, the 
Ktunaxa essentially lose their place of worship and the grizzly bears will likely 
be driven out of the area to keep them away from ski resort guests. However, 
the majority glosses over this fact by simply saying that the Constitution does 
not cover this type of religious claim, which demonstrates the limited scope 
that the case was viewed in by the Court.43  
C. Brief History of Aboriginal Law in Canada 
In order to understand how Aboriginal issues are treated in Canada, 
specifically how Aboriginal law differs from other countries such as the 
United States, it is important to look at the origins and historical development 
of this area of the law. Aboriginal law in Canada is complex. A history of 
colonialism and westward expansion by European powers, at the expense of 
the Aboriginal people already living on the land, has shaped the relationships 
between First Nations, the federal government of Canada, and their legal 
relationship. Overtime, Canadian law concerning Aboriginal people has 
originated in a “culturally mixed medium drawn together from diverse 
jurisprudential sources.”44 
First Nations historically differ from one another much the same way 
as one country differs from another.45 As a result, “each group created its own 
distinctive ceremonies and formalities to renew, celebrate, transfer or abandon 
their legal relationships” which have evolved to become the foundation for 
 
41   Id. para. 112. 
42  Qat’muk, supra note 3. 
43  JOHN BORROWS, RECOVERING CANADA: THE RESURGENCE OF INDIGENOUS LAW 4 (2002). 
44  Id. 
45   Id. at 3. 
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many complex systems of law in North America.46 “[C]ontemporary 
Canadian law concerning Aboriginal peoples partially originates in, and is 
extracted from, these legal systems.”47 However, Canadian law concerning 
Aboriginals also has looked to and derived from British and American 
common law, and to a lesser extent, international law.48 Reasons for this 
inclusion is that, like Aboriginal systems, these legal systems and sources are 
“similarly grounded in the complex spiritual, political, and social customs and 
conventions of particular cultures, in this case those of European nations.”49 
Historically, Canadian courts have frequently refused to apply 
Aboriginal law, preferring instead to recognize and apply common law as the 
sole source of authority for the law in Canada.50As a result, the courts have 
ruled that the Crown and its servants must conduct themselves with honor—
the honor of the crown—when dealing with First Nations and Aboriginals.51  
The honor of the crown is a fundamental principle of Canadian 
constitutional law.52 It is a core principle that gives rise to a variety of 
substantive obligations.53 In Manitoba Metis Federation Inc. v. Canada 
(Attorney General), the Supreme Court of Canada traced this principle to the 
early period of European exploration and settlement when the British Crown 
claimed title over the vast land in North America – land that was already 
occupied and governed by Aboriginals.54 From the conflict of these claims 
between European and Indigenous folk arose the special relationship between 
the Crown and the Aboriginal people of Canada.55 Such relationship required 
 
46  Id. at 3–4. 
47  Id. 
48  Id. 
49  Id. See generally LAW AND THE ORDER OF CULTURE (Robert Post ed.1991) (ebook) (“cultural 
creation of legal meaning”). 
50  BORROWS, supra note 43, at 4. 
51  KEEPING PROMISES: THE ROYAL PROCLAMATION OF 1763, ABORIGINAL RIGHTS, AND TREATIES IN 
CANADA 15 (Terry Fenge & Jim Aldridge eds. 2015) [hereinafter “KEEPING PROMISES”]. 
52  Id. 
53  Beckman v. Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation, 2010 SCC 53, para. 42 (Can.); Haida Nation v. 
British Columbia, 2004 SCC 73, paras. 16 & 18 (Can.); Manitoba Metis Federation Inc. v. Canada, 2013 
SCC 14, para. 73 (Can.). 
54  Manitoba Metis Federation Inc. v. Canada, 2013 SCC 14, paras. 66–67 (Can.) (first quoting Haida 
Nation v. British Columbia, 2004 SCC 73, para. 32 (Can.), then quoting Taku River Tinglit First Nation v. 
British Columbia 2004 SCC 74, para. 24 (Can.)).  
55  KEEPING PROMISES, supra note 51, at 15. 
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that the Crown deal honorably with the First Nation aboriginals and this 
requirement was expressed in the Royal Proclamation of 1763.56 
The Royal Proclamation of 1763 was the first Constitution of what is 
known today as Canada.57 The Proclamation referred to “the several Nations 
or Tribes of Indians, with whom [the Crown is] connected, and who live under 
[the Crown’s] Protection” and laid the foundation for the constitutional 
recognition and protection of Aboriginals in Canada.58 Under this document, 
the British authorities in the New World agreed to protect the Aboriginal 
people living in British-colonized North America against unfair treatment by 
British settlers, as well as to recognize Aboriginal title.59 Thus, even today, 
many indigenous leaders view the Royal Proclamation as guaranteeing their 
sovereignty.60 The Courts have concluded that the ultimate purpose of the 
honor of the Crown is the reconciliation with the First Nations, who lived in 
Canada pre-European contact, with the assertion of Crown sovereignty.61 
However, the courts have not come to the same interpretation as the 
indigenous leaders so as to advance and improve Aboriginal rights. In fact, 
between 1982 and 1985, out of nineteen claims Aboriginals brought to court, 
none prevailed in their favor.62 
Before 1982, the idea of aboriginal rights in Canada was questioned by 
both the federal and provincial governments, as well as by non-Aboriginal 
Canadians.63 Most of the concern centered on whether these rights even 
existed. Such denial of Aboriginal rights was made possible by the “dominant 
discourse” that structured Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal relations at that 
time.64 According to Dale Turner, this discourse was reinforced by four 
 
56  Id. at 15, 33. 
57  Id. 
58  Id; Royal Proclamation of 1763: Relationships, Rights and Treaties – Poster, INDIGENOUS AND 
NORTHERN AFFAIRS CAN., https://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1379594359150/1379594420080 (last 
visited Dec. 15, 2019) (In Canada the Royal Proclamation of 1763 is recognized as crucially important in 
establishing protocols, policies, and procedures of enduring treaty relations with Aboriginal people). 
59  KEEPING PROMISES, supra note 51, at 15, 33. 
60  Id. 
61  Id.; Nikita Rathwell, Supreme Court of Canada Expands on the Honour of the Crown in Manitoba 
Métis Federation Inc. v Canada (Attorney General), THECOURT.CA (Mar. 26, 2013), 
http://www.thecourt.ca/12233/. 
62  KEEPING PROMISES, supra note 51, at 15, 33. 
63  DIMITRIOS PANAGOS, UNCERTAIN ACCOMMODATION: ABORIGINAL IDENTITY AND GROUP RIGHTS 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA 14 (2016). 
64  Id. (citing DALE A. TURNER, THIS IS NOT A PEACE PIPE: TOWARDS A CRITICAL INDIGENOUS 
PHILOSOPHY 34–35 (2006)). 
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intertwining beliefs that were held by non-Aboriginal Canadians: 1) policies 
specific to Aboriginals were discriminatory; 2) every citizen of Canada should 
have the same legal and political status; 3) treaties should no longer be used; 
and 4) Aboriginal people should assimilate to mainstream society 
completely.65 
The first Aboriginal rights case in Canada was St. Catherine’s Milling 
v. The Queen.66 This case gave rise to two statements that set legal precedent 
in Canada, with one concerning Aboriginal rights and the other provincial 
rights.67 This is significant because at the time provincial rights were of greater 
importance than Aboriginal rights.68  
The issue in St. Catherine’s arose from the long-standing dispute 
between the province of Ontario and the federal government over Ontario’s 
northwestern boundary.69 The Aboriginals, whose traditional lands were at 
stake, were neither consulted nor brought to the witness stand in the ensuing 
court action.70 In 1884, the Privy Council in London held in favor of Ontario.71 
However, the federal government delayed enacting the enabling legislation to 
put the decision into effect.72 In response, Ontario filed suit in the High Court 
of Ontario against the federally licensed St. Catherine’s Milling and Lumber 
Company for illegal logging on provincial lands.73 The main argument came 
down to determining who exactly had control over the Aboriginal lands in 
Treaty Three.74 St. Catherine’s and Ottawa argued that before the Crown 
purchased the land title, Aboriginals had been the owners of the land, but were 
restricted to only sell the land to the Canadian government, which meant that 
the land could not be sold to individuals or provincial governments.75  
Because of the wording of the Royal Proclamation of 1763, which 
referred to “lands reversed for Indians,” treaties were an essential prerequisite 
 
65  Id. 
66  St. Catherine’s Milling and Lumber Co. v. R., [1887] 13 S.C.R. 577 (Can.). 
67  OLIVE P. DICKSON & WILLIAM NEWBIGGING, A CONCISE HISTORY OF CANADA’S FIRST NATIONS 
279 (2nd ed. 2010). 
68  Id.  
69  Id. 
70  Id. 
71  Id. 
72  Id. 
73  Id. 
74  Id. 
75  Id. 
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for the colonial expansion into British North America; most importantly, it 
indicated that only the federal government could engage in that activity.76 The 
decision of the Court concluded that since legal ownership of the land had 
never been attributed to the Treaty Three Aboriginals, they had not conveyed 
any such rights to the federal government.77 As such, the license that had been 
granted to St. Catherine’s was invalid. According to the Court, Treaty Three 
was legally meaningless because the Aboriginals “could treat with the Crown 
for the extinction of their primitive right of occupancy.” However, if they 
refused to do this, the government could continue with their settlement and 
expansion efforts, outright displacing Aboriginal people from their lands.78 
Adding to the notion that Aboriginal rights did not exist was the leading 
legal precedent, at the time, which characterized Aboriginal rights as 
“usufructs” by declaring that Aboriginal occupancy of Canadian land was a 
personal and usufructuary right, dependent upon the will of the government.79 
The term “usufruct” means “the right of using and taking the fruits of property 
belonging to another.”80 In the context of Aboriginal rights, the usufruct 
framework meant that even though First Nations and Aboriginals used and 
benefitted from their traditional lands, the lands ultimately belonged to the 
Crown.81 
However, the view of usufruct was called into doubt in Calder et al. v. 
Attorney General of British Columbia.82 This case, brought before the courts 
by Nisga’a chief Frank Calder, reviewed the existence of Aboriginal title 
claimed over lands historically occupied by the Nisga’a people of British 
Columbia.83 In Calder, the Nisga’a Tribal Council argued that its title to the 
lands in and around the Nass River Valley had “never been lawfully 
extinguished.”84 While the Aboriginal plaintiffs technically lost, a majority of 
justices more generally recognized the Aboriginal right to land in their 
 
76  Id. 
77  Id. 
78  Id. 
79  PANAGOS, supra note 63, at 14  
80  Id. at 15. 
81  Id. 
82  Calder et. al v. Att’y Gen. of British Columbia, [1973] S.C.R. 313 (Can.). 
83  1973 - In the Calder Case, the Supreme court held that Aboriginal rights to land did exist, citing the 
1763 Royal Proclamation, DECOLONIZED, https://www.decolonize-ed.com/single-post/2017/07/07/1973---
In-the-Calder-Case-the-Supreme-court-held-that-Aboriginal-rights-to-land-did-exist-citing-the-1763-
Royal-Proclamation (last visited Apr. 6, 2019). 
84  Id. 
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opinion’s reasoning.85 In other words, it recognized, for the first time, that 
Aboriginal title has a place in Canadian law.86 An important result of the 
Calder case was that it led to the establishment of the modern land claims 
process, which significantly shifted the landscape for Aboriginal rights in 
Canada.87 
1. Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 
Under modern constitutional law, Aboriginal peoples enjoy the same 
rights and freedoms as other Canadian citizens and are also entitled to the 
same services and benefits from the government.88 However, it was not until 
the 1980s that Aboriginal rights were finally recognized by the Canadian 
Constitution in Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.89  
Section 35 of the Canadian Constitution has a robust framework for the 
protection of indigenous rights.90 This is one way in which Aboriginal peoples 
have a variety of unique rights that pertain to them alone that are protected in 
the fundamental law of the land.91 Through Section 35 of the Constitution Act 
of 1982, the Canadian Government recognizes the inherent right of self-
government as an existing Aboriginal right.92 Recognition of this inherent 
right is based on the perception that the Indigenous Peoples of Canada have 
the right to govern themselves in matters that are core to their communities, 
important to their unique cultures, identities, traditions, languages, and 
institutions, and to their special relationship to their land and resources. 93 
Section 35(1) embedded “existing Aboriginal and treaty rights” in the 
Constitution—meaning that these rights could be extinguished only by 
constitutional amendment rather than by a more simple act of Parliament.94 
 
85  Id. 
86  Id. 
87  PANAGOS, supra note 63, at 15; PETER RUSSELL, CONSTITUTIONAL ODYSSEY: CAN CANADIANS 
BECOME A SOVEREIGN PEOPLE? 94 (2004). 
88  Minister Supply and Serv. Can., The Aboriginal Constitutional Process: An Historic Overview, in 
ABORIGINAL PEOPLES, SELF-GOVERNMENT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 13 (1991). 
89  Id.; Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.). 
90  The Government of Canada's Approach to Implementation of the Inherent Right and the Negotiation 
of Aboriginal Self-Government, CROWN-INDIGENOUS AND N. AFF. CAN., www.aadnc-
aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100031843/1100100031844#inhrsg (last visited Apr. 6, 2019). 
91  Minister Supply and Serv. Can., supra note 88. 
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94  MICHAEL ASCH, ON BEING HERE TO STAY: TREATIES AND ABORIGINAL RIGHTS 21 (2014). 
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However, the Constitution did not address what “existing Aboriginal rights” 
consisted of nor how to determine whether there was an existing right.95 
In 1999, the Supreme Court of Canada issued two separate opinions on 
the same case regarding a treaty right to fish.96 This case began in 1999 when 
Donald Marshall Jr., son of a Mi’kmaq hereditary grand chief, was caught 
fishing for eels without a license, during the off season, and with illegal nets.97 
Marshall had previously been wrongfully convicted of murder and spent 
eleven years in prison as a result, so he was wary of the Canadian justice 
system. Instead of seeking a fishing license through the Canadian government, 
Marshall asked a Mi’kmaq chief whether he could fish.98 The chief, in turn, 
told him that because the Mi’kmaq had signed treaties with the British, 
Marshall had the right to fish and could continue doing so.99 Marshall, 
however, was later arrested and charged with violating federal fishing 
regulations.100 He was eventually convicted and his conviction was affirmed 
by the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal.101 The Supreme Court of Canada, 
however, overturned his conviction. His acquittal was a major victory for 
Aboriginal rights because the court held that under Section 35(1), Aboriginals 
had the right to hunt and fish, as had been granted to them by treaties made 
between the First Nations  and the British in the late 1700s.102 The decision 
includes the caveat that Aboriginal fishing rights protected under Section 
35(1) are nonetheless subject to regulation in the best interest of the 
Aboriginal people.103 Yet, the Marshall decision “emphasized the importance 
of respecting treaty rights more than the government’s power to regulate treaty 
rights under certain conditions.”104 
 
95  Id. 
96  R. v. Marshall (No. 1), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 456 (Can.); R. v. Marshall (No. 2), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 533 
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97  R. v. Marshall (No. 1), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 456, para. 1 (Can.). 
98  R. v. Marshall (No. 2), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 533, para. 6 (Can.). 
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100  Id. 
101  Id. 
102  IAN GREENE, THE CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS: 30+ YEARS OF DECISIONS THAT SHAPE 
CANADIAN LIFE 370–71 (2014). 
103  Id. at 373. 
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2. The Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is a part of the Canadian 
Constitution and sets out rights and freedoms Canadians believe are important 
in a “free and democratic society.”105 The Charter is separated into seven 
substantive provisions: 1) fundamental freedoms, 2) democratic freedoms, 3) 
mobility rights, 4) legal rights, 5) equality rights, 6) language rights, and 7) 
minority-language educational rights.106 
The Charter protects every Canadian’s right to be treated equally under 
the law, with equal application to jurisdictions and authorities governed by 
Aboriginal governments.107 This equal application guarantee ensures a 
balance between individual rights and freedoms and the unique values and 
traditions of Aboriginal peoples in Canada.108  
One important section in this charter, which had not been analyzed in 
court before the Ktunaxa case, is Section 2. Section 2 governs fundamental 
freedoms and subsection (a) specifically states that everyone has the freedom 
of conscience and religion.109  
One of the most important cases dealing with freedom of religion under 
Section 2, which was addressed by the Court in Ktunaxa, is Regina v. Big M 
Drug Mart Ltd.110 This landmark decision struck down the Alberta Lord’s Day 
Act, which required businesses to close on Sundays, for violating Section 2(b) 
of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.111 The Court used the reasoning in the 
Regina case to support their decision to rule against the Ktunaxa’s religious 
 
105  Guide to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, GOV. OF CAN., 
https://www.canada.ca/en/canadian-heritage/services/how-rights-protected/guide-canadian-charter-rights-
freedoms.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2019); Learn about the Charter, CAN. DEPT. OF JUST., https://www.justi
ce.gc.ca/eng/csj-sjc/rfc-dlc/ccrf-ccdl/learn-apprend.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2019). 
106  GREENE, supra note 102, at 65. 
107  Human Rights in Canada, CANADIAN HUM. RTS. COMM’N, https://www.chrc-
ccdp.gc.ca/eng/content/human-rights-in-canada (last visited Dec. 16, 2019); The Government of Canada's 
Approach to Implementation of the Inherent Right and the Negotiation of Aboriginal Self-Government, 
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visited Apr. 6, 2019). 
108  Id. 
109  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, Section 2, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.). 
110  R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 (Can.). 
111  Patrick Stothers-Kwak, What R v Big M Drug Mart Can Teach the US Supreme Court about 
Corporate Religious Freedom, THECOURT.CA (Feb. 17, 2014), http://www.thecourt.ca/what-r-v-big-m-drug-
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freedom claim.112 Specifically, they emphasized that the court in Big M Drug 
Mart Ltd. defined Section 2(a) “as protecting ‘the right to entertain such 
religious beliefs as a person chooses, the right to declare religious beliefs 
openly and without fear of hinderance or reprisal, and the right to manifest 
religious belief by worship and practice or by teaching and dissemination.’”113 
The Court concluded that Section 2 has two aspects.114 The first aspect was 
that people have the freedom to hold religious beliefs.115 The second aspect 
was that they also had the freedom to manifest those beliefs.116 This definition 
has been adopted by other subsequent cases.117 The Court concluded that the 
Ktunaxa would be free to believe in the Grizzly Bear Spirit and practice their 
religion despite the construction of the ski resort, so construction of the ski 
resort would not violate Section 2(a).118  
If there is any threat to land title or fundamental freedoms, Aboriginal 
and First Nations communities are, in theory, able to use both Section 2(a) of 
the Charter and Section 35 of the Constitution to fight back in court. Section 
35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 is meant to protect Aboriginal rights from 
erosion by Parliament or provincial legislature. However, that does not always 
mean Aboriginals are guaranteed to win or receive a favorable outcome, 
especially when using a provision that has not been directly applied to 
Aboriginal rights before. 
Given that there is more case law dealing with Aboriginal rights under 
Section 35 of the Constitution, Aboriginal rights are more likely to be upheld 
directly under this provision than under the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms.119 
 
112  Ktunaxa Nation v. British Columbia, 2017 SCC 54, para. 62 (Can.). 
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D. Aboriginal Case Law: Aboriginal Rights vs. Aboriginal Title 
Based on Canadian case law, Aboriginal rights and Aboriginal title 
appear to be entwined with one another.120 The Supreme Court of Canada has 
concluded that Aboriginal title is just one category of Aboriginal rights.121 
Certain free-standing Aboriginal rights—for example fishing or hunting–can 
exist even without Aboriginal title over the land.122 Thus, the tests for 
determining whether an Aboriginal right exists or whether there is Aboriginal 
title are different, although they tend to connect to one another.123 While 
Aboriginal title is a type of Aboriginal right recognized and affirmed by 
Section 35(1), it is different from other Aboriginal rights because it “arises 
where the connection of a group with a piece of land ‘was of a central 
significance to their distinctive culture.’”124 Thus, the intertwinement between 
Aboriginal rights and Aboriginal title is not only strong, but also to an extent, 
inseparable. However, decisions from the Supreme Court of Canada have 
confirmed that existing Aboriginal and treaty rights tend to be interpreted 
more generously under Section 35.125 Furthermore, Section 35 affords these 
rights stronger constitutional protection from erosion by governments.126 
1. Aboriginal Rights: Determining Whether an Aboriginal Right Exists 
and How an Aboriginal Right Should Be Defined 
a. R. v. Sparrow 
The first Canadian Supreme Court case considering Aboriginal rights 
and whether they existed under Section 35 was R. v. Sparrow in 1990. In this 
precedent-setting case, a member of the Musqueam Indian Band was charged 
with violating the Fisheries Act.127 He alleged that the right to fish was an 
immemorial right protected by treaty by virtue of Section 35.128 The Supreme 
Court found that the tribal member had a protected right to fish and set out a 
 
120  See Kent McNeil, Aboriginal Title and Aboriginal Rights: What's the Connection?, ALTA. L. REV. 
117–48 (1997). 
121  Id. at 147. 
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criteria for interpreting rights under Section 35.129 The court held that the 
government of Canada have a fiduciary relationship with Aboriginals under 
Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982; any denial of Aboriginal rights under 
Section 35 must be justified and Aboriginal rights must be given priority.130 It 
also did not set limits on the types of rights that can be categorized as 
Indigenous rights and emphasized that the rights must be interpreted a flexible 
manner “sensitive to the Aboriginal perspective.”131 The Court stated that 
Section 35 only protects rights that were not extinguished (i.e., surrendered) 
prior to the date the Constitution Act, 1982 came into effect.132  
Under the Sparrow Test, one must first determine whether or not a right 
has been infringed upon.133 Infringement is found if government activity: 1) 
imposes undue hardship on the First Nation; 2) is considered by the court to 
be unreasonable; and 3) prevents the right-holder from exercising that right.134  
Second, the test outlines what might justify an infringement upon an 
Aboriginal right.135 Infringement can be justified if: 1) it serves a valid 
legislative objective—i.e., conservation of natural resources; 2) there has been 
minimal infringement as possible in order to achieve the desired result; 3) fair 
compensation was provided; 4) and Aboriginal groups were consulted.136 
b. R. v. Van de Peet 
In R. v. Van der Peet, two Aboriginal men went fishing for sockeye 
salmon.137 The men had a license that allowed them to fish legally but 
prohibited them from selling the fish.138 The salmon was later sold by the 
common-law wife of one of the men, Dorothy Van der Peet, who was a 
member of the Sto:lo Nation.139 Van der Peet was later charged, under British 
Columbia Fishery Regulations, with having unlawfully sold fish that was 
caught under a food-only fish license.140 The issue before the court was 
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whether the law preventing the sale of the fish infringed the Aboriginal right 
of fishing under Section 35.141 Ultimately, the court ruled that Aboriginal 
fishing rights did not extend to commercial selling of fish.142 
The Court developed an “Integral to a Distinctive Culture Test,” which 
modified the Sparrow Test, to determine how to define an Aboriginal right as 
protected by Section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.143 The Test has ten 
main parts: 
(1) Courts must take into account the perspective of Aboriginal 
peoples themselves 
(2) Courts must identify precisely the nature of the claim being made 
in determining whether an Aboriginal claimant has demonstrated 
the existence of an Aboriginal right 
(3) In order to be integral a practice, custom or tradition must be of 
central significance to the Aboriginal society in question 
(4) The practices, customs and traditions which constitute 
Aboriginal rights are those which have continuity with the 
practices, customs and traditions that existed prior to contact 
(5) Courts must approach the rules of evidence in light of the 
evidentiary difficulties inherent in adjudicating Aboriginal 
claims 
(6) Claims to Aboriginal rights must be adjudicated on a specific 
rather than general basis 
(7) For a practice, custom or tradition to constitute an Aboriginal 
right it must be of independent significance to the Aboriginal 
culture in which it exists 
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(8) The integral to a distinctive culture test requires that a practice, 
custom or tradition be distinctive; it does not require that that 
practice, custom or tradition be distinct 
(9) The influence of European culture will only be relevant to the 
inquiry if it is demonstrated that the practice, custom or tradition 
is only integral because of that influence. 
(10) Courts must take into account both the relationship of Aboriginal 
peoples to the land and the distinctive societies and cultures of 
Aboriginal peoples.144 
Here, the Court found that the specific right claimed was the right to 
exchange fish for money.145 As such, this is the right that must be considered 
an integral part of the distinctive culture of the Sto:lo community. However, 
the Court concluded that while the Sto:lo did exchange fish for money pre-
Europeans contact, it was not a significant, integral or defining feature of their 
society.146 The reasoning for this conclusion was that: 1) pre-contact fish 
exchanges were done primarily for food purposes, 2) there was no indication 
that the exchanges were widespread enough to suggest that they were a 
defining feature of the society, 3) the exchange between the Sto:lo and the 
Hudson Bay Company occurred due to European influence, and 4) there was 
an absence of specialization of the exploitation of fishery within the society.147 
Therefore, there was no aboriginal right found to sell the fish and the Court 
did not proceed to the rest of the test.148 
2. Aboriginal Title: Its Scope, the Importance of the Duty to consult, and 
Meaningful Consultation 
a. Delgamuukw v. British Columbia 
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, a Canadian Supreme Court case 
decided in 1997, became a landmark decision on Aboriginal title.149 While the 
newly adopted 1982 Constitution enacted Section 35 and added protection for 
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existing Aboriginal rights, it did not specify what those rights were, which 
Delgamuukw helped clarify.150 The decision described the scope and type of 
the protection given to Aboriginal title under Section 35 of the Constitution 
Act, 1982, defined how a claimant can prove Aboriginal title, and clarified 
how the justification test from R. v. Sparrow applies when Aboriginal title is 
infringed.151 
In Delgamuukw, hereditary chiefs from the Gitxsan and the 
Wet'suwet'en attempted to negotiate jurisdiction, recognition of ownership, 
and self-government since Europeans first began settling on their traditional 
lands in the 1800s.152 The Canadian federal government and the British 
Columbia provincial government “rebuked all efforts by the Gitxsan and 
Wet'suwet'en Chiefs to negotiate on ownership.”153 The Chiefs then filed suit 
claiming unextinguished Aboriginal title over the land in question.154  
This groundbreaking ruling by the Supreme Court contained the first 
clear and definitive statement on Aboriginal title in Canada and the scope of 
protection that the title is afforded under the Constitution Act of 1982.155 It 
held that Aboriginal title included the right to exclusive use and occupation of 
land for purposes that are not necessarily aspects of the Aboriginal 
community’s essential practices, customs, and traditions, as long as they are 
not irreconcilable with the Aboriginal community’s attachment.156 It included 
language from Sparrow which said Section 35(1) “provides a solid 
constitutional base upon which subsequent negotiations can take place” to 
outline the justification test for infringements of Aboriginal title.157 The 
justification test included: 1) the infringement of the Aboriginal or First 
Nation must be in furtherance of a legislative objective that is compelling and 
substantial; and 2) there must be an assessment of whether the infringement 
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is consistence with the special fiduciary duty relationship between the Crown 
and the Aboriginal people.158  
Three aspects of Aboriginal title are relevant here.159 First, Aboriginal 
title includes the right to exclusive use and occupation of the land.160 Second, 
it also encompasses the right to choose what uses land can be put to, subject 
to the ultimate limit that those uses cannot destroy the ability of the land to 
sustain future generations of Aboriginals.161 Finally, the lands held pursuant 
to Aboriginal title have an inescapable and inevitable economic component.162 
Therefore, negotiations should include all Aboriginal nations which have a 
stake in the territory claimed and should be entered into in good faith by the 
Crown.163 It also set a precedent for Indigenous rights and the use of oral 
testimony in Canadian courts.164 The Court acknowledged that oral history is 
typically the only record that Aboriginals have of their past.165 While oral 
testimony evidence does present some challenges as “out-of-court statements, 
passed on through an unbroken chain across the generations of a particular 
aboriginal nation to the present-day,” the Court ruled that the law of evidence 
must be adapted so as to accommodate and place oral testimony and an equal 
footing with other types of historical evidence (e.g. historical documents) 
which the courts are familiar with.166 Failure to do this would create and 
impose a difficult burden of proof on Aboriginals.167 
b. Haida Nation v. British Columbia 
Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests) is the leading 
Supreme Court decision on the Crown’s duty to consult Aboriginal groups 
prior to exploiting lands to which they may have claims.168 The case’s history 
traces to more than forty years before it was decided. In 1961, the provincial 
government of British Columbia issued a “Tree Farm License” on the Queen 
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Charlotte Islands, located off its coast.169 At the time, the Haida Nation had a 
pending claim to the island land, which had not yet been recognized at law.170 
The Haida Nation also claimed an Aboriginal right to harvest red cedar in that 
area. In 1999, the Minister of Forests authorized a transfer of the license to 
the Weyerhauser Company without consent from or consultation with the 
Haida Nation.171 In 2000, the Haida Nation brought suit, requesting that the 
replacement and transfer be set aside.172 The issue before the Court was 
whether there was a duty to consult with the Aboriginal nation and if so, what 
that duty entailed.173 The Court held that the Crown had a duty to consult with 
and accommodate Aboriginal groups with claims to land and Aboriginal rights 
prior to taking action that may adversely affect those interests.174 The specific 
duty varies depending on the strength of the claim and degree of the harm and 
cannot be delegated to third parties.175 
c. Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia 
In 2014, forty-one years after the Supreme Court held in Calder that the 
concept of Aboriginal title exists under Canadian law, the Court formally 
declared that the Tsilhqot’in people have Aboriginal title in a specific area of 
British Columbia historically occupied by them.176 Tsilhqot’in Nation v. 
British Columbia is an important Canadian Supreme Court decision that “had 
an immediate impact on First Nations communities that held Aboriginal title 
or were claiming Aboriginal title, but which had not been consulted—or felt 
they had not been consulted in good faith—about commercial developments 
on their traditional lands.”177 The Nation consisted of six bands of several 
thousand Aboriginals who had lived in land they considered rightfully theirs 
in central British Columbia for centuries.178 However, there were no treaties 
or land claims agreement that applied to their traditional land base.179 
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By 1983, the British Columbia provincial government granted a permit 
to a logging company to cut trees in the area claimed by the Tsilhqot’in.180 
Reasonably, the Nation objected and began land claims litigation for part of 
their territory where several thousand of them resided.181 Negotiations 
continued until 2012, when the British Columbia Court of Appeal decided that 
the Tsilhqot’in had not established their land claim, although it could 
potentially be established in the future.182 The decision was appealed to the 
Supreme Court, which recognized the Tsilhqot’in’s Aboriginal title over the 
land.183  
The Court relied heavily on the Haida Nation decision. The Justices 
pointed out that the government of British Columbia did not make any attempt 
to consult with the Tsilhqot’in or to accommodate the concerns the Tsilhqot’in 
had about logging in their territory.184 British Columbia asserted two reasons 
for their support of the logging. First was that the logging was necessary to 
battle pine-battle infestation.185 Second, that there would be economic benefits 
to the people of British Columbia from the logging, which constituted a 
legislative objective substantial and compelling enough to infringe Aboriginal 
interests without consultation.186 The Court found that government failed to 
provide compelling evidence for these claims and even with compelling 
evidence, consultation have been required because there was substantial 
evidence supporting a valid land claim by the Tsilhqot’in.187  
To prove a valid land claim, occupation must be 1) sufficient, 2) 
continuous, and 3) exclusive.188 The Court concluded that the evidence 
indicated that the Tsilhqot’in had continuously occupied the land for centuries 
and that their occupation was “exclusive” because other Aboriginal groups 
would need permission to pass through Tsilhqot’in territory.189 As to the duty 
to consult, the Court concluded that the degree of consultation and 
accommodation required is “proportionate to the strength of the claim and to 
the seriousness of the adverse impact the contemplated governmental action 
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would have on the claimed right.” Greater requirement of consultation and 
accommodation is needed where title has been established.190 If consultation 
is found to be inadequate, the decision of the government can be suspended 
or quashed by the courts.191 Furthermore, the Crown must also “ensure that 
the proposed government action is substantively consistent with the 
requirements of” Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982—requiring both a 
compelling and substantial government objective and that the proposed action 
is consistent with the fiduciary duty of the Crown to the Aboriginal people.192 
Where Aboriginal title is unproven, the Crown still owes a procedural duty 
imposed by the honor of the Crown to consult with the First Nation and, if and 
when appropriate, accommodate the unproven Aboriginal interest.193 
3. Application of Case Law in Ktunaxa Case 
a. Aboriginal Rights Tests 
In Ktunaxa, the Court made no direct findings as to the existence of the 
Ktunaxa’s religious right. Had the Ktunaxa brought their claim under Section 
35, the Court would have been required to consider whether or not the claimed 
religious right existed prior to enactment of the Constitution Act, 1982. The 
religious claim could have been proven using oral history as evidence of the 
Ktunaxa’s deeply held spiritual, and religious belief in the grizzly bear and its 
connection to Qat’muk since time immemorial, at the trial stage.194 If such 
evidence would have been introduced and deemed valid, the Court would 
have likely found that the Ktunaxa’s religious right did in fact exist prior to 
1982, and therefore should have been afforded protection. 
Had the Canadian Supreme Court used the Sparrow Test, they would 
have likely concluded that there was a definite infringement on the religious 
freedom right of the Ktunaxa in connection to their land. First, the 
construction of the ski resort would not only drive away an essential part of 
the Ktunaxa’s religion, the grizzly bears, but also completely obliterate their 
traditional land. The important relationship between Qat’muk’s and the 
Grizzly Bear Spirit is also inseparably intertwined with its importance for 
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living grizzly bears now and in the future.195 Destroying this traditionally 
sacred land would create a domino effect which would drive away the 
important physical connection the Ktunaxa have to the Grizzly Bear Spirit and 
would simultaneously forever do away with their place of worship of 
thousands of years. For the Crown and Court to argue that the Ktunaxa can 
easily find another place to worship would gravely undermine the serious 
impact that the government action is creating. Because destruction of the land 
and removal of the grizzly bears harms the Ktunaxa’s spiritual connection at 
Qat’muk, there would be a challenge to determine whether the Ktunaxa would 
be able to practice their religious beliefs at all. Second, this hardship would 
likely be viewed as unreasonable because this land and spiritual connection 
are not tangibly replaceable. The Ktunaxa cannot simply find another sacred 
site with the same spiritual and religious significance. This land is 
irreplaceable and as such not likely to be given an appropriate monetary value 
in the eyes of the Ktunaxa Nation. Third, as mentioned before, with the land 
and the grizzly bears gone, the Ktunaxa would likely no longer have their 
spiritual connection to the Grizzly Bear Spirit, or at least the connection would 
likely not be as strong. Thus, under Sparrow, there would exist a clear 
infringement on the Ktunaxa’s religious freedom. 
Moving to the second part of the test, whether infringement is justified, 
this infringement is not justifiable because while the Ktunaxa Nation was 
consulted and may possibly have been offered compensation, the first two 
factors are not met. In this case, there is no valid legislative objective since 
the primary reason that the Ktunaxa land is in dispute is that the government 
intended to build a permanent ski resort. This would destroy land and force 
wildlife, such as the grizzly bears, from their homes, contrary to what the 
Court deemed as a valid legislative objective, e.g. conservation. Additionally, 
this would mean excessive infringement because 1) a significant portion of 
Ktunaxa land would be taken away, along with their sacred land, and 2) the 
grizzly bear population would be driven away, thereby destroying the 
foundation of the spiritual connection the Ktunaxa have to the land. This is a 
clear infringement on the Ktunaxa’s right to their land and their religious 
freedom. 
Modern Courts use the ten-part “Integral to a Distinctive Culture Test” 
from Van der Peet, to identify an Aboriginal right in Section 35(1) of the 
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Constitution Act, 1982, specifically, practices, traditions and customs central 
to the Aboriginal societies that existed prior to contact with the Europeans.196  
First, considering the perspective of the Ktunaxa, it is evident that they 
feel their religious freedom is an integral part of their society as the “Grizzly 
Bear Spirit” is an important source of guidance, strength, protection and 
spirituality.”197 Second, the precise nature of the claim brought by the Ktunaxa 
is that the creation of a permanent ski resort on their land would drive away 
the grizzly bear population, which in turn would impact their fundamental 
worshipping practices. The grizzly bear is an important aspect of their religion 
and connection to the land, the ski resort would completely change and more 
than likely destroy that connection. Third, the Ktunaxa’s belief is distinct from 
other Aboriginal societies because they are the only ones that have been 
identified as to both have a stake in Qat’muk and a religious connection to the 
land in question.198 Fourth, the Ktunaxa likely can prove continuous control 
of the land prior to contact with the use of oral, as mentioned before, or 
anthropological evidence. The fifth factor is related to factor four in that it 
requires courts to consider the difficulties that First Nations may experience 
in providing evidence given that their practices, customs, and traditions did 
not include written records.199 Sixth, the claim is adjudicated on a specific 
basis since it is specifically asserting a religious right tied to the Ktunaxa’s 
ancestral land and the impact they would suffer as a result of destruction of 
the site. Seventh, the religious claim is likely of independent significance to 
the Ktunaxa. There is no mention of it arising from another practice or custom. 
Eighth, the religious claim would make the Ktunaxa a distinctive culture, 
under Van der Peet, in that it is an important and fundamental part of their 
society as whole which is interconnected to their land. Ninth, there is no 
evidence presented that this religious practice was affected by European 
culture, and even if it was “European arrival and influence cannot be used to 
deprive an Aboriginal group of an otherwise valid claim to an Aboriginal 
right.”200 Finally, as mentioned before, the religious freedom claim is 
inevitably tied to the Ktunaxa’s land since the grizzly bears, who plays an 
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important role in their religion as symbols of the Grizzly Bear Spirit, inhabit 
it. 
b. Aboriginal Title Tests 
Had the Ktunaxa brought a claim for land title instead of a religious 
freedom claim, they would have likely been more successful and had an easier 
time meeting the requirements outlined in Delgamuukw, Haida Nation, and 
Tsilhqot’in.  
Using Delgamuukw’s justification for infringement test, the first part of 
the test is not met. Construction of a permanent ski resort is not in furtherance 
of a legislative objective that is compelling and substantial.  
Not only does building a ski resort disregard the Ktunaxa’s interest, but 
it also damages the reconciliation of the Ktunaxa with the broader community. 
This differs from Delgamuukw in which the Court found that the Aboriginal 
and the broader community had a shared interest in the conservation of 
fisheries and that that interest was a compelling and substantial objective.201 
The conservation recognized fishing as an integral part to many Aboriginal 
cultures and sought to reconcile Aboriginal societies and the broader 
communities by ensuring that there are fish enough for everyone.202 No such 
argument can be made here for building a ski resort. Given that the first 
requirement would not be met, it is inevitable the second requirement would 
not be met either.  
Applying Tsilhqot’in to Ktunaxa further supports that the Ktunaxa 
might have had a more favorable outcome had the Ktunaxa gone through the 
provincial government tribunals instead of the federal administrative court 
system. First, the Ktunaxa would likely be able to establish title with oral 
history as was done in both the Delgamuukw and Tsilhqot’in cases. There is 
some indication that the evidence could have been compelling, given that even 
the Supreme Court Justices noted that the Ktunaxa had been living on Qa’muk 
for thousands of years. Second, even though the Court found consultation to 
be sufficient, building a year-long ski resort would not constitute a legislative 
objective substantial and compelling enough to infringe Aboriginal interests. 
While the British Columbia government can argue that the ski resort would 
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benefit the Ktunaxa people by, perhaps, creating jobs for them, it is clear that 
based on the sentiments of the Ktunaxa people over the construction of this 
project, they are unlikely to seek out jobs from it. As such, the government of 
British Columbia would need to accommodate the Ktunaxa’s concerns. If this 
cannot be done, the government action cannot proceed because it has not 
justified infringing on the Aboriginal group’s right. 
4. Implications for Future Aboriginal Cases 
While the Ktunaxa decision should not be looked at for precedential 
value, there are major implications that arise from it, specifically regarding 
the duty to consult, religious freedom claims, and judicial review. The case 
may push other First Nations to look at the possible connection between a 
religious claim and their lands—thereby bringing future religious claims 
under Section 35 of the Constitution Act, rather than Section 2 of the Charter 
of Freedoms and Rights. Moreover, these claims will likely be brought in a 
trial setting vs. administrative tribunal setting so that a trial court can make 
adequate conclusions as to the validity of the claims presented. 
a. Duty to Consult 
Early on in Ktunaxa, the Court critically analyzed two issues: 1) the 
issue of the sacred site being raised “late” in the consultation process and 2) 
the issue of whether Ktunaxa were not willing to accept any of the 
accommodation offered, or willing to compromise on the matter of the 
destruction of the sacred site through the construction of the permanent ski 
resort.203 The first issue was viewed by the Court as the Ktunaxa not asserting 
their rights in a timely manner.204 Given how late in the process these concerns 
were raised, the Court did not weigh or find them persuasive in the outcome 
of consultation. 205 
However, it is worth recognizing that the consultation in this case began 
well before any of Aboriginal law precedent-setting cases were decided. This 
was not mentioned by the Court or was it acknowledged in any way. 
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Furthermore, no other case before or after Ktunaxa has determined what an 
appropriate amount of time to bring a claim would be or whether a claim 
should be brought by a certain time. Thus, without further guidance, 
Aboriginal nations are left to wonder whether there is a time limit to bringing 
claims and whether their claims will be taken less seriously if not brought 
immediately in the during consultation process. 
If the Ktunaxa could prove that their connection to the land—for 
religious worship and practices—has continued over many generations and is 
directly connected to how and whether future generations will continue 
religious practices, the Ktunaxa’s claim for title under Section 35 would be 
very strong. That showing would likely require the government to halt any 
construction efforts that would adversely affect the Ktunaxa’s interests in the 
land.  
b. Religious Freedom 
The Court also implicitly reasons that Section 2(a) of the Charter does 
not recognize that spiritual beliefs and practices can be fundamentally 
connected to specific locations. Therefore, Section 2(a) does not extend to the 
“object of beliefs” or the “spiritual focal point of worship.”206  
This conclusion is not persuasive. If one was to compare religious belief 
and its connection to a certain location in the context of a church, mosque, or 
synagogue, the courts would likely find that destruction of these sites would 
fundamentally interfere with the ability to worship.207 However, the Court did 
not recognize these parallels and instead seemed to have downplayed the 
importance of the Ktunaxa’s religious belief in the grizzly bear. 
As of now, there is no other case that has been brought before the 
Canadian courts by a First Nation that asserts a religious freedom claim 
connected to their ancestral land. Given the disappointing outcome of the 
Ktunaxa case, Aboriginals will likely not use Section 2(a) as a tool to protect 
the spiritual importance of a specific sacred site. Thus, best chance of success 
will be to bring a land claim under Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. 
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c. Judicial Review 
On judicial review, the Ktunaxa sought to have the Court declare 
Qat’muk a sacred site to the nation in order to prevent permanent construction 
on that site.208 However, the Court concluded that an administrative decision 
maker, and subsequently a judge on judicial review, is not able to rule on the 
existence of a claim to a Section 2(a) Charter right.209 Specifically, the Court 
stated that “the solution is not for courts to make far-reaching constitutional 
declarations in the course of judicial review proceedings incidental to, and ill-
equipped to determine, Aboriginal rights and title claims.”210 
The decision of the Court infers that there is a limit as to what can be 
determined on judicial review in the context of the duty to consult and 
accommodate, indicating that judicial review does not function as a forum for 
the adjudication of the existence of rights.211 Instead, this determination must 
take place in a trial setting, where the Ktunaxa’s claims could have been heard 
through evidence presented to the trial court.212  
III. CONCLUSION 
The Ktunaxa’s claim of religious infringement by the construction of a 
permanent ski resort on their ancestral land was amply supported by their oral 
history and religious practices. Construction of the permanent ski resort will 
have an irreparable impact on their land. However, the record did not 
adequately explore the religious significance of this land and the Supreme 
Court ultimately ruled for the government. While this is not the right outcome, 
it is what the Aboriginal people and the courts are left with. Had the Ktunaxa 
instead brought an Aboriginal land claim instead of a religious freedom claim, 
they would have had a better chance of preventing the construction of a ski 
resort on their land. While no precedential value should be given to this case 
due to the undeveloped record, the implications of this decision are clear: 
Aboriginal nations must rely on Section 35 claims of the Constitution Act, 
1982 to stop the government from infringing on their rights. A further 
consideration is that as time goes on, less evidence of First Nations 
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occupation, practices, and customs will be available as traditional use of oral 
history is dying out. This negatively impacts future generations of Aboriginals 
who will be left with be little use to support claims to their rights and land 
titles. History and the present ongoing issues in Aboriginal law indicate that 
this, unfortunately, is very likely to happen. 
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